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Abstract
Existing theory on the form of government suggests that a parliamentary system pro-
motes a larger size of government than does a presidential system. This paper extends the
existing theory by allowing for distortionary taxation. A main result is that if taxation
is su¢ ciently distortionary, the parliamentary system may promote a smaller size of gov-
ernment than the presidential system. The proposed mechanism appears consistent with
several empirical patterns in the data that cannot be explained by other theories.
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1 Introduction
It is now well established in the literature that constitutional provisions, such as the form of
government and the electoral system, are associated with scal policy outcomes.1 Theories that
can explain this observed variation are, however, in scarce supply, particularly with regard to the
form of government. One exception is the theory by Persson et al. (1997, 2000), which suggests
that presidential systems should be associated with a lower level of public goods provision, a
lower level of economic diversion of public funds by politicians, a lower level redistribution, and
hence a smaller size of government than the parliamentary system.2 Missing in this theory,
however, is an account of the fact that taxation may be distortionary.3
The present paper extends the framework in Persson et al. (2000) by allowing for tax dis-
tortions. A main new insight is that the parliamentary form of government promotes a stronger
incentive to internalize the distortions arising from taxation. If the marginal distortion is suf-
ciently high, the monotonic relationship in the existing theory between regime type and the
size of government may even break down. Hence, with a high marginal tax distortion, the size
of government and the total economic loss from the distortions can be lower in a parliamentary
system than in a presidential form of government, while the opposite is more likely if taxation is
less distortionary.
In the parliamentary system the mechanism causing a stronger internalization of the dis-
tortions of taxation is essentially the same as the one that causes the parliamentary regime to
produce a higher, and closer to the social optimum, provision of public goods as delineated in
the theory by Persson et al. (2000). Since the parliamentary form of government represents a
majority of the voting population, its voters do not only have a strong incentive to internalize the
social benets from public goods provision, but they are also incentivized to take into account
the social costs of taxation. Consequentially, additional tax distortion, above an endogenously
determined threshold level, will e¤ectively constrain the size of government in a parliamentary
system. The threshold level is determined in the intra-governmental bargaining game. Intuitively,
if the government is dominated by one strong member, all residual government revenue will be
1Economic analysis of the scal e¤ects of constitutions dates back to the late 1950s and early 1960s (see, e.g.,
Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Brennan and Buchanan 1980). Buchanan and Congleton (1979) studies the role of
the tax scheme (i.e., proportional versus progressive taxation) as a disciplinary device on government behavior.
Moral hazard and the disciplinary e¤ects of elections has also been studied extensively (e.g., Barro 1973; Ferejohn
1986), but without special attention to the role of di¤erent institutions. Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003, 2004,
2008) provide overviews of the theoretical and empirical literatures. For a critical review of Persson and Tabellini
(2003), the reader may consult Acemoglu (2005).
2Political ine¢ ciency and diversion have been studied extensively in the literature on political agency. Persson
and Tabellini (2000) and Besley (2006) provide overviews of several classes of political agency models.
3Distortions from taxation generally include deadweight losses due to price distortions, tax avoidance, tax
evasion, compliance costs, and collection costs. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the costs of taxation are
much higher than indicated by earlier estimates. For example, Feldstein (1999) nds that the marginal deadweight
loss of changes in the income tax rates may be more than 10 times as large as found by Harberger (1964): the
relative deadweight loss caused by increasing existing tax rates may exceed $2 per $1 of revenue. Other researchers
nd that also other types of taxation seem to be a­ icted with signicant social costs. See, e.g, Fisman and Wei
(2004) on the relationship between tax rates and tax evasion, Slemrod (2007) for an overview of the literature on
tax evasion, and Auerbach (2005) on the deadweight losses of corporate taxes.
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directed towards this members constituents, and taxation will hence be perceived as less costly
to these recipients. The incentive for the government to internalize the tax distortions is then
relatively weak. If, on the other hand, political power is evenly distributed among two or more
members of government, redistributionary benets must be shared among all the governments
voters, implying that the tax distortions will be perceived as more costly to each recipient.
Due to its separation of powers, the presidential form of government promotes a weaker
incentive than the parliamentary system for the legislators to take account of the distortionary
costs of taxation. In particular, the separation of powers characterizing this system implies
that decisions taken by one governmental body e¤ectively constrain the decisions taken by other
branches at a later stage of the political game. For example, a budget request submitted by
the President of the United States cannot be executed until the associated budget resolution is
approved by the House and the Senate, and then the associated appropriation bills are enacted.
Hence, although it is the U.S. Congress which species both tax and expenditure decisions, the
President has the option of signing the legislation or vetoing it. Voters tend not to fault their
own representatives for the level of taxation, of which the governmental bodies are collectively
responsible for, but they do credit their own representatives for spending that comes back to
their districts. So while the same body makes the taxing and spending decisions, voters tend to
perceive that these choices are made separately.
In the model, the voters of the legislative body that decides on the size of government in
the presidential system (the tax committee) cannot know for sure whether their legislators will
belong to the winning faction that actually gets to benet from the proceeds of large government.
Thus these voters main concern is keeping taxes as low as possible, just high enough to nance
the preferred level of public goods, given an incentive-compatibility constraint on the legisla-
tors. Compared with the parliamentary system, the presidential system thus promotes a strong
incentive to keep economic diversion of the legislators low, but a relatively weaker incentive to
internalize the economic distortions of taxation.4
The insight that more encompassing interests can lead to more economically e¢ cient policy
outcomes, ceteris paribus, is not new. According to Olson (1993): the more encompassing an
interest the larger share of the national income it [ref: the majority in government] receives
taking all resources together the less social losses from its redistribution to itself(p. 571).5 As
a strong majority coalition will have more encompassing interests than a divided government, it
would also be expected to have a stronger incentive to internalize the social benets and costs
of public policy.
The hypothesis that scal policy is more sensitive to the distortionary costs of taxation under
a parliamentary form of government appears broadly consistent with the observed patterns of
the growth and variation in the size of government across countries. First, it appears consistent
4Crain et al. (1985) discusses the separation of powers, the structure of committees, and the size of government
in U.S. state legislatures.
5See McGuire and Olson (1996) for a formalized version of this theory. The e¢ ciency consequences of encom-
passing interests (in the context of autocracy) is analyzed in, e.g., Overland et al. (2005).
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with the observed pattern of a much stronger growth in the size of government among countries
with a parliamentary rather than a presidential form of government, as documented in Persson
and Tabellini (2003), among other studies.6 In particular, under the assumption that an overall
reduction in the distortionary costs of taxation has taken place over time an observation for
which there are several indications in the empirical literature7 the pattern of stronger govern-
ment growth in the parliamentary system is consistent with the main insights of the proposed
theoretical framework. Second, there is also a clear pattern in the data of a much stronger vari-
ability in the size of government across parliamentary regime types. Given that the distribution
(not the level) of tax costs is not systematically correlated with the form of government across
countries, the proposed theory is also consistent with this empirical regularity.
The hypothesis that the size of government in parliamentary systems is more responsive to
tax distortions is established more rigorously by using a panel of OECD countries in the period
from 2000 to 2008. The main result from this empirical exercise is that the indicator of tax
distortion (which is a measure of the tax wedge on labor income) exerts a negative e¤ect on the
size of government when the form of government is parliamentary, but has either no (zero) e¤ect
or a positive e¤ect under a presidential form of government. Due to several potential endogeneity
issues, this result should not be assigned a causal interpretation. However, the correlations t
well with the main hypothesis of the paper, suggesting that the proposed mechanism may be
relevant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical framework is presented
in Section 2, while the equilibrium concept is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 constitutes the
core of the paper, and discusses the relationship between diversionary and distortionary costs
of taxation, and the size of government across the two regime types. Section 5 presents panel
data evidence which is suggestive that the size of government is more responsive to distortions of
taxation in parliamentary than in presidential systems. Finally, Section 6 sums up and concludes,
by pointing out several avenues for future research.
2 The model: voters, politicians, and institutions
Consider a society consisting of three distinct groups of citizens, denoted by i = 1; 2; 3. Each
group consists of a continuum of voters with unit mass. Time t is measured discretely, and the
time horizon is innite.
6See Figure 4, Section 5.2, for a plot of this relationship. The overall growth in the size of government over
time has been studied extensively in the literature (see Garrett and Rhine 2006, for a broad overview), and the
arguments are typically divided into demand side and supply side arguments (as in, e.g., Kau and Rubin 1981).
The mechanisms related to the size of government proposed in this literature are being briey reviewed in Section
5.3.
7A brief overview of di¤erent indicators of the e¢ ciency of the tax system is provided in Section 5.2, Foonote
25.
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The preferences of a member of group i in an arbitrary starting period j are given by
uij =
1X
t=j
(t j)U i (qt) ; (1)
where  < 1 is a discount factor, qt is a vector of policies at t (to be dened below), and U i is
the utility function per period. Period utility, U i (qt), is quasi-linear, such that
U i (qt) = c
i
t +H (gt) = yt (1   t) + rit +H (gt) ; (2)
where yt is private income,  t is the tax rate, rit is a transfer payment to group i, and gt is the
supply of Samuelsonian public goods. In the remainder of the discussion, and without loss of
generality, yt will be normalized to unity to simplify the analytical derivations and expressions.
Public goods are valuable to citizens, and the preferences for public goods, H (gt), are assumed
to satisfy the Inada conditions.
The public policy vector q in period t is dened by
qt =

 t; gt;

rit
	
;

slt
	
; (3)
where gt, rit, and  t are all constrained to be nonnegative, and s
l
t denotes the diversion beneting
legislator l. As in Persson et al. (1997, 2000), diversion may refer to the nancing of political
parties, outright diversion, or as an allocation of resources beneting the legislators but not the
citizens. Imposing a balanced budget restriction, the government budget constraint in period t
is given by
3 [ t   c (;  t)] =
X
i
rit +
X
l
slt + gt  rt + st + gt: (4)
In contrast to Persson et al. (2000), the budget constraint reects that there may be real
costs, c ( t), associated with levying taxes. In the baseline model it will be assumed that the
tax cost function is linear in the tax rate, such that c (;  t) =  t,  2 [0; 1).8 ;9 The product
of the parameter  and the equilibrium level of taxation 3 is then the economy-wide e¢ ciency
loss from tax distortions; hence  also has the interpretation as the average cost of taxation
8Later, in Section 4.4, the analysis is extended to employing a convex tax cost function.
9The most commonly used application of distortionary tax costs is labor supply costs. Assuming that labor
supply is elastic, a proportional income tax distorts the relative prices of consumption and leisure. Hence, an
increase in the proportional or, equivalently, the marginal tax rate creates a real e¢ ciency loss by reducing
labor supply, and hence real income (given that labor demand is also elastic). However, levying taxes may
generate a myriad of e¢ ciency losses in di¤erent markets. Since the present analysis focuses on the e¤ects of
economic distortions from taxation in general, rather than in one particular market, it seems reasonable to model
the distortions on a reduced form. In a recent contribution on ine¢ cient redistribution policies, Drazen and
Limão (2008) model the tax collection costs in a similar way. Battaglini and Coate (2007) use a dynamic model
of legislative bargaining to analyze the e¤ects of distortionary taxation on public policy, but do not perform
comparative politics with regard to the rules for legislation. Their result that a high level of distortions (i.e., weak
state capacity) will generate e¢ cient legislative decisions (in the long run) is consistent with the intuition of the
present analysis. However, as will be demonstrated below, the e¢ ciency of the political outcome may critically
depend on the rules for legislative bargaining.
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in the economy. The baseline tax cost function is similar to the one applied by Becker and
Mulligan (2003), and implies larger e¢ ciency losses the higher the overall level of taxation is in
the economy. As a higher level of taxation implies a proportional increase in the economic losses
from taxation, the government revenues from any given tax rate  is equal to 3 t (1  ).
Each region i coincides with a voting district and is represented by exactly one legislator
l = 1; 2; 3: Separate elections under plurality rules take place in each voting district. In period
j, the incumbent legislator l has preferences over outcomes, given by
vlt =
1X
t=j
(t j)V l (qt)Dlt; (5)
where
V l (qt) = s
l
t (6)
is the utility in each period. Dlt is a dummy variable which equals one if legislator l holds o¢ ce
in period t, and is zero otherwise.
At the end of each time period, each region holds an election and the candidate with the
largest number of votes wins. The incumbent runs against a single opponent, who is drawn at
random from a large set of identical candidates. An incumbent who is not reelected can never
return to political o¢ ce.
Throughout the analysis it will be assumed that the actions of the voters and politicians are
contingent on payo¤-relevant information in period t only, implying that voters cannot commit
to intertemporal reelection rules across periods. Hence the equilibrium is stationary, and time
subscripts are dropped when there is no risk of confusion.
2.1 The presidential-congressional regime type
The important feature in the model which distinguishes the presidential-congressional regime
type from the parliamentary for of government is that decisions on di¤erent policy dimensions
in the presidential regime are made sequentially by di¤erent governmental bodies, rather than
simultaneously by one single government coalition, as in the parliamentary regime. Thus, in
the presidential system, later proposals are bound by decisions made at an earlier stage. Albeit
highly stylized, this feature is recognizable in real-world politics, such as in the U.S. presidential-
congressional system, where decisions made by one governmental body e¤ectively do bind later
decisions. In the model, the decisionmaking process is assumed to consist of two stages, one
stage for setting taxes and the other stage for the allocation of spending.10
The sequence of events that denes the legislative game in the presidential regime is as follows:
10The mechanisms and intuition of the model are robust to an even ner separation of the decision over the
size and allocation of the budget, as long as the two are separated. For a discussion of this issue, as well as
other related issues, such as amendment rights, collusion, and having a national, rather than regional, ballots, the
reader is referred to Persson et al. (2000).
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(1) Nature randomly selects two agenda setters among the incumbent legislators, one for
taxes and one for the allocation of public spending, a and ag, respectively.
(2) Voters set their reservation utilities for their voting rule, bi.
(3) Agenda setter a proposes a tax rate.
(4) The legislators vote. If at least two legislators are in favor of the proposal, the policy is
implemented. Otherwise, a default tax rate  =  < 1 is enacted.
(5) Agenda setter ag proposes

g;

si
	
;

ri
	
subject to the budget constraint r + s + g 
3 (1  ).
(6) The legislators vote. If at least two legislators are in favor, the policy is implemented.
Otherwise, a default policy, with g = 0, ri = 0, and si =  (1  ), is put in place.
(7) Elections are held.
In the model voting is retrospective. Note that the sequence of decisions also matters outside
of equilibrium, as earlier decisions impose constraints at subsequent stages. Also note that at
stage 5, legislator ag attempts to form the coalition that is best for her. If ag is indi¤erent between
the other legislators, it is assumed that they have the same probability of being included in the
winning coalition.
2.2 The parliamentary regime
The key feature distinguishing the parliamentary from the presidential regime is that in the
parliamentary regime agenda-setting powers are concentrated in the hands of a government
coalition that decides on each element in the policy vector simultaneously. Each coalition partner
has a veto right, the veto can be thought of as a vote of no condence for the government. If the
veto is exercised, a government crisis follows. In the case of a government crisis, a new agenda
setter is picked at random from the legislature and the decisionmaking process reverts to a simple
legislature characterized by one, single agenda setter (see the Appendix, Section 8.1.1, for the
equilibrium in the simple legislature).11
The parliamentary game is characterized by the following stages:
(1) Nature randomly selects two coalition partners (ministers) among the incumbent legis-
lators; one becomes the agenda setter for public nance decisions, a, and the other her junior
partner, m.
(2) Voters set reservation utilities for their voting rule, fbig.
(3) Agenda setter a proposes

a; frig; g; fslg

: ra + ga + sa  3a (1  ).
(4) The junior coalition partner can veto the joint proposal from stage 3. If approved, the
proposal is implemented and the game goes on to stage 9. If not, the government falls and the
game goes on to stage 5.
(5) Nature randomly selects a new agenda setter a0 among the three legislators.
11The model captures the basic costs of triggering a government crisis in parliamentary systems without a con-
structive vote of condence namely the prospective loss of valuable proposal powers associated with ministerial
portfolios. Huber (1996) and Persson et al. (2000) use the same approximation.
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(6) Voters reformulate their reelection strategies, conditional on the status of their represen-
tative after the government crisis.
(7) The agenda setter a0 proposes an entire allocation qa0 .
(8) The legislators vote on this proposal. If approved by at least two legislators, qa0 is
implemented. If not, the legislative bargaining ends and a default outcome with  = s
l
1  = 
and g = ri = 0 is implemented.
(9) Elections are held.
As noted above, the parliamentary game implies that decisions on the di¤erent elements
in the policy vector are made simultaneously. However, note that sequential proposals within
government would not add any e¤ective separation of powers; as long as a veto at the last
proposal stage triggers a government crisis, sequential intra-governmental voting would produce
identical results.12
3 Equilibrium
In all regime types, an equilibrium is a vector of policies qt (bt) and a vector of reservation
utilities bt, such that, in any period t, when all players take as given the equilibrium outcomes
of periods t+ k; k  1:
(I) for any given bit, there exists at least one legislator apart from the agenda setter who
weakly prefers qt (bt) to the default outcome;
(II) for any given bt, the agenda-setting legislator(s) prefer(s) qLt (bt) to any other policy
satisfying part I;
(III) the reservation utilities bit are optimal for the voters in each district i, when one takes
into account that policies in the current period are set according to qt (bt) and takes as given
the reservation utilities in other regions b it and the identity of the agenda setter(s);
(IV) whenever the game is characterized by more than one node, the optimality conditions
for policy proposals and for voting by the legislators must hold at each node of the game, for
any given voting rules and decisions at earlier nodes in the same period, and when one takes into
account equilibrium behavior at subsequent nodes of the same period.
Additionally, political equilibria di¤er according to the specic constitutional features. The
regime specic equilibrium denitions are described in detail the Appendix (Denitions A2 and
A3, in Sections 8.1.2 and 8.1.3, respectively).
4 Costs of taxation and comparative politics
Distortions from taxation create deadweight losses, and hence constitute real costs.. From the
voterss viewpoint, however, taxation in representative democracy is potentially associated with
costs even if taxation is nondistortionary. The reason is that the legislators, once in o¢ ce, are
12Persson et al. (1997) provide a formal proof of this proposition.
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endowed with powers to divert resources. Agenda-setting legislators optimize their respective ob-
jective functions by trading o¤ the benets from diversion against their reelection probability and
the associated expected future payo¤s. The resulting equilibrium level of diversion constitutes a
diversionary tax cost from the voterspoint of view.
The incentive to divert resources is constrained by the political institutions, and in particular
by the constitutional features that guide the formation of government and the processes of
legislative bargaining. Intuitively, a coalition of legislators who gets to decide the entire size and
allocation of the government budget is likely to propose a larger budget and, implicitly, a higher
level of diversion (given its expectation of the reelection probability, and future equilibrium- and
out-of-equilibrium payo¤s), while a legislator who gets to decide only on the size of the budget,
but not on its allocation, is likely to minimize other legislators opportunity for diversion. In
either case, however, the opportunity to divert will ultimately be limited by state capacity, which
in turn will be e¤ectively constrained by the level of tax distortion.13 Hence, the diversionary
and distortionary costs of taxation are likely to interact to a¤ect equilibrium policy.
In the remainder of this section, the comparative politics of the size of government in the
presidential and the parliamentary regime types, respectively, will be analyzed more formally,
with particular attention to the level of economic distortions of taxation. For expositional reasons,
the full political equilibrium propositions and proofs are delegated to the Appendix (Propositions
A2 and A3 in Sections 8.1.2 and 8.1.3, respectively). The exposition included in the main text
thus focuses on the key mechanisms and intuition regarding the association between the form of
government, the level of distortionary taxation is, and the equilibrium size of government.
The discussion is further structured by, rst, discussing the comparative politics in the case
where the level of tax distortion is low(i.e., below a well-dened threshold), and, second, by
discussing the case where the distortionary taxation is high(i.e., above the same threshold).
4.1 Low levels of distortion (  2=3)
Any relevant equilibria of the model imply positive tax rates
 
C ; P > 0

, positive levels of
diversion
 
sC ; sP > 0

, and positive levels of public goods provision
 
gC ; gP > 0

, where the
notation C and P refers to the presidential-congressional (C) and the parliamentary equilibria
(P ), respectively. The equilibrium level of pure redistribution may, however, be either strictly
positive or equal to zero
 
rC ; rP  0, depending on whether the nonnegativity constraint on
redistribution is binding. For example, if the government is su¢ ciently poor (e.g., due to weak
state capacity), or if preferences are strongly skewed towards public goods, it may not be in the
self-interest of the agenda-settersconstituents to demand redistribution toward themselves, as
the marginal benet from public goods will be higher than the marginal benet from private
consumption.
The equilibria in which the nonnegativity constraint on redistribution is binding will be
13State capacity here refers to the ability of the government to raise revenue from taxation, given any level of
potential output in the economy.
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analyzed below, but rst consider the case where the political equilibria are characterized by
positive levels of redistribution: rC , rP > 0.
Proposition 1 (i) When   1=3 and the nonnegativity constraint on r is not binding, the
equilibrium tax rates in both regimes will be insensitive to changes in ; (ii) If 1=3 <   2=3,
the equilibrium tax rate can be decreasing in  in the parliamentary regime, dependent on the
intra-governmental Nash bargaining outcome; (iii) In the region where the equilibrium tax rate
is insensitive to changes in  (i.e.,   1=3),  will a¤ect the size of government exclusively via
its impact on state capacity, and not via the (equilibrium) tax rate.
Proposition 1 has the following intuition (for the full formal proof, consult Propositions
A2 and A3 in the Appendix). In the parliamentary regime, the coalition government decides
simultaneously on the size of the budget and on its allocation. Consequently, the voters are
residual claimants on government revenue, and are hence incentivized to maximize the level of
taxation as long as the marginal cost of redistribution is lower than the marginal net benet (via
increased private consumption). The exact threshold for when the tax distortion get so high that
redistribution is no longer benecial depends, from the viewpoint coalition governments voters,
on the outcome of the intra-governmental Nash game over redistribution.
There are two extreme, possible outcomes of the intra-governmental Nash game over redistri-
bution: one in which the stronger part receives all the redistribution, and another in which the
amount of redistribution is shared equally between the two groups of voters. Any equilibrium
outcome implying a positive level of redistribution must lie in the interval between these two
extremes.
Redistribution, within the current framework, may be seen as a subsidy on private consump-
tion, the size of which depends on the fraction of the (voting) population that holds the residual
claim on government revenue. If the Nash outcome means that one group receives all of the
redistribution (if any), this works as a subsidy on private consumption paid by the other two
constituencies. Redistribution would thus provide a net gain for the beneting voter group, up
to the point where  = 2=3. Beyond this threshold, an equilibrium with a positive level of redis-
tribution would never be consistent with the votersreservation utilities, as the level of distortion
would preempt the potential redistributionary gains from the implicit subsidy. However, if the
Nash outcome involves that the two coalition partners share the budget for redistribution exactly
equally, this would imply a lower level of subsidy, as perceived by the voters in each group
(because now only one constituency subsidizes the private consumption of the two other con-
stituencies). Hence, in the latter case, a positive level of redistribution would only be consistent
with the reservation utilities of the government coalitions voters as long as  < 1=3; beyond the
threshold  = 1=3, one monetary unit paid in taxes by the governments voters would generate a
less than one monetary unit of redistribution to each of the groups. Thus, when 1=3    2=3,
there exist multiple equilibria, which outcomes depend on the intra-governmental Nash game for
redistribution and on the shape of H (:).14
14The 2=3-threshold (and to a lesser extent the 1=3-threshold, since this only requires an equal power division
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Hence, in the parliamentary regime, if  < 1=3, the tax rate will be pushed up to its maximum,
i.e., P = 1, and the tax distortion, , will only have rst-order e¤ects for the size of government
(by e¤ectively constraining state capacity). If 1=3    2=3, there are multiple equilibria,
depending on the intra-governmental Nash game for redistribution and on the shape of H (:),
and  will exert either only a rst-order e¤ect, via a reduction in state capacity, on the size of
government if the equilibrium involves P = 1 and positive redistribution, or both the rst-order
e¤ect and an additional second-order e¤ect, via reduced levels of redistribution and public goods
provision.
The presidential regime contrasts with the parliamentary one in that powers are separated and
policy decisions are taken sequentially. In the model, the level of taxation is decided prior to the
level and direction of public expenditures. Hence, when deciding on the tax rate, the tax minister,
a , (and her junior partner) cannot know with certainty that she will be the direct beneciary
of any residual government revenue. Thus she discounts the expected future equilibrium payo¤
by the probability that she will be part of the winning coalition at the expenditure stage of the
game. In the specic parameterization of the model, all legislators i 6= ag are in the winning
coalition during the expenditure stage of the game (stages 5 and 6 of the presidential game) with
a probability of 1=2. Thus, the junior partner at stage 5, m, demands diversion sm to satisfy
sm=2 + W  vd, where vd = 12 (1  ) and represents the expected payo¤ in a disequilibrium
history with maximized taxes and diversion. Here, (1  ) is the allocation of diversion to the
junior partner at the expenditure stage of the game in a disequilibrium history, and 1=2 is the
probability that a will be in the winning coalition.15 W is the equilibrium continuation value,
which is an implicit function of the equilibrium tax rate. In equilibrium, incentives must be
compatible such that sm =  (1  )   W  1      2W . The implied tax rate thus satises
C  1   11 W . Incentive compatibility requires that the tax rate, C , is set high enough
so that the expected utility from complying with the equilibrium weakly exceeds the expected
utility from deviating and receiving the out-of-equilibrium payo¤.
Turning to the reservation utilities of the voters, as voters require that the equilibrium
tax rate cannot not exceed the incentive-compatible level, since these voters are not residual
claimants at the expenditure stage. Consequently, the equilibrium tax rate in the presidential
regime type will be (weakly) lower than unity. When the parameterization of the economy implies
that the equilibrium entails positive levels of redistribution (rc > 0), the relative importance of
distortions on the in- and out-of-equilibrium expected payo¤s exactly cancels out (i.e.,  decreases
the expected payo¤s from complying or deviating from the equilibrium path in the exact same
in government) will in general depend on the parametrization of the model, and in a real world contextit would
depend on the exact composition of the government coalition. Intuitively, if the stronger coalition partner would
represent more than one-third of the constituencies, this would pull in the direction of a lower threshold, as the
government would have incentives to internalize more of the costs of taxation. Similarly, the opposite would be
more likely if the stronger coalition partner would represent a fraction smaller than one-third of the constituency.
15Note that the total size of government in a disequilibrium history with maximized taxes and diversion will
be 3 (1  )( i.e., the tax rate, 1, times the taxable size of the economy, (1  ), times the three constituencies),
and that incentive-compatibility implies that the agenda-setting legislator at the expenditure stage will demand
2 (1  ).
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proportions), such that C = 1  
(1+ 23 )
. The equilibrium tax rate is thus a decreasing function
of the discount factor  (because more patient legislators settle with lower levels of diversion),
but independent of the distortions of taxation. The distortionary tax cost  will hence only
a¤ect the size of government via its rst order e¤ect on state capacity.16
Corollary 1 When   2=3 and the nonnegativity constraint on r is not binding, pos-
itive shifts in  will have a stronger negative impact on the size of government if the form of
government is parliamentary, as opposed to presidential.
The above discussion implies that when  < 1=3, tax rates in both regime types will be
independent of  (in the parameter space with positive levels of redistribution). If 1=3    2=3
there may exist equilibria in the parliamentary regime where the tax rate would be negatively
related to , dependent on the outcome of the intra-governmental Nash game for redistribution.
Consequently, because the size of government is larger in the parliamentary regime than in the
presidential regime whenever   2=3, the e¤ects of changes in the distortions of taxation on the
size of government will be stronger in the parliamentary regime. If the outcome of the Nash game
would be that the redistribution is shared equally among the voters of the government coalition,
the tax distortions will be internalized with even lower levels of tax costs than  = 2=3, which
would strengthen the negative e¤ect of  on the size of government in this regime type.
As discussed above, the e¤ects of  are expected to be stronger in the parliamentary system,
mainly because the size of government is larger in this regime type without any distortions of
taxation, implying that the rst-order e¤ect of tax costs on the size of government is larger than
in the presidential regime. Additionally, dependent on the Nash outcome on redistribution, the
voters in the parliamentary regime might internalize the social costs from tax distortions, which
constitutes a second order e¤ect that comes in addition to the rst-order e¤ect. However, if the
nonnegativity constraint on redistribution in the presidential regime is binding (because citizens
have strong preferences for public goods, relative to private consumption), or if the combined
costs of taxation in the presidential regime are su¢ ciently high, such that 1 =32(1 ) > 1,
17 the
comparative results on the e¤ect of tax distortions on the size of government are indenite and
generally depend on the shape of H (:).
The intuition for this result is that when citizens care strongly enough for public goods,
the voters of the tax minister, a , know that the voters of the spending minister, ag, will pri-
oritize public goods provision over redistribution toward themselves. Hence, those voting for
the tax minister have an incentive to raise taxes above the level associated with the incentive-
compatibility constraint, until the marginal benet of raising taxes, in terms of an increase in
the provision of public goods (which they know will be implemented at the expenditure stage of
the game because those voting for the spending minister care equally much about public goods)
equals the marginal cost. However, because raising taxes not only increases the distortions of
16Note that in the more general case of convex tax costs, as demonstrated in Section 4.4., C will also be a
decreasing function of the tax distortions parameter.
17An intuition for this expression is provided below, following Proposition 2. The full derivation is provided in
the proof of Proposition A2 in the Appendix.
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taxation, but also increases the diversionary costs by potentially allowing the legislators to break
o¤ from the equilibrium path, the tradeo¤ between public goods and private consumption will be
di¤erent than in the parliamentary regime. Generally, the e¤ect of  on the size of government
may be both weaker or stronger than in the parliamentary regime. The e¤ect may be weaker
because higher tax costs due to higher incentive compatible levels of diversion imply a low equi-
librium level of public goods provision. On the other hand, the e¤ect may be stronger due to the
combined rst-order e¤ects of both sources of tax costs: the diversionary and the distortionary.
In sum, in all equilibria which sustain a positive level of redistribution, the e¤ect of  is
expected to be stronger in the parliamentary regime. However, when considering also equilibria
in which the nonnegativity constraint on r is binding, the comparative statics of the e¤ect of 
on the size of government is inconclusive when   2=3.
4.2 High levels of distortion ( > 2=3)
As the level of distortion rises above  = 2=3, the incentive to take the distortions into account
when determining the tax rate is further strengthened in the parliamentary regime, but less so
in the presidential regime.
Proposition 2 In the equilibrium of the parliamentary regime, if  > 2=3, the distortionary
costs of taxation are fully internalized and no redistribution will take place. If P < 1, the
implied provision of public goods, H 1g

1
3(1 )

, equals the social optimum.
In the parliamentary regime, the allocation of residual government revenues between the
constituencies of the coalition government is determined in a multiple equilibria Nash game.
When  > 2=3, an outcome involving redistribution cannot be sustained as an equilibrium
outcome. To see this, consider the subgame that follows a government crisis.18 If  > 2=3,
it follows (see Proposition A3 in the Appendix) that the reservation utilities for any voter i is
given by H (g0)   g0   3(1 )(1 )1 =3 , which involves no redistribution and a level of public goods
provision equal to gP = min
h
H 1g

1
3(1 )

; 2(1 )1 =3
i
. In this expression, 2(1 )1 =3 is a corner
solution for the provision of public goods in the case where the optimal provision of public
goods is nancially unattainable. Any policy proposal in the parliamentary regime involving
redistribution to the constituencies of one or both of the government partners when the distortions
exceed the threshold  > 2=3, would be vetoed by the coalition member(s) whose voters benet
the least from the redistribution.
Given that the equilibrium tax rate is less than one, the equilibrium level of public goods
provision, H 1g

1
3(1 )

, equals the social optimum. Here, 13(1 ) is the social cost of providing
one unit of public goods, which is increasing in the level of distortions, . When  > 2=3, this
cost coincides with the costs of a marginal increase in the provision of public goods as perceived
18Although the mechanics and intuition are slightly di¤erent, the equilibrium policy vector of the parliamentary
regime and a simple legislature (with just one single agenda setter) is identical when  > 2=3 (see the Appendix
for details).
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by each member of the government coalition. Thus, the parliamentary equilibrium implies that
tax distortions, when su¢ ciently high, are fully internalized.
In the presidential regime, on the other hand, the distortions from taxation are only partially
internalized. In particular, the marginal cost of public goods provision, as perceived by the
voters of the tax minister, a , is given by
1 =3
2(1 ) , which is found by substituting the incentive-
compatibility condition into the government budget constraint, solving for the tax rate, and
di¤erentiating with respect to the level of public goods provision.19 This expression reects the
fact that the voters of a also take into account the diversionary costs of taxation (which depend
on ), but only partially internalize the tax distortion as 1 =32(1 ) >
1
3(1 ) . Yet because the
incentive-compatibility condition constitutes a lower bound for the level of taxation, the optimal
level of public goods provision as perceived by those voting for legislator a , H 1g

1 =3
2(1 )

, may
not be feasible in equilibrium. Consider the problem of legislator a and her voters: if citizens
have relatively weak preferences for public goods (such that rC > 0 in equilibrium), the voters
of a prefer a low tax rate but will be forced to implement the minimum tax rate implied by the
incentive-compatibility condition. The implied tax rate will, as argued above in the discussion
following Proposition 1 (and as derived in the Appendix under Proposition A2), be completely
independent of the level of tax distortions. Moreover, given the incentive-compatible tax rate, it
is up to legislator ag and her voters to determine the level of public goods provision by trading
o¤ the benets from public goods provision against benets from redistribution towards her own
constituents since, at this stage of the game, the tax rate has already been determined, ag and
her voters have no incentive to take into account the tax distortion. The separation of powers
in the presidential regime thus leads to an incomplete internalization of the distortionary costs
of taxation, and the tax distortions have only rst-order e¤ects for the size of government.
Note however that, whenever the marginal tax costs, as perceived by the voters of legislator
a , exceed the threshold
1 =3
2(1 ) > 1, and citizens have su¢ ciently strong preferences for public
goods (such that rC = 0), the distortionary costs of taxation are partially internalized also in
the presidential regime. Yet, as will be shown below, the internalization of the tax distortions is
still weaker than in the parliamentary regime, implying that the equilibrium size of government
can be higher in the presidential than in the parliamentary system.
4.3 Comparative analysis of the size of government
The above discussion implies that the incentive to internalize the distortionary costs of taxation
critically depends on the form of government. Two clear cases emerge. First, when the level
of tax distortions is low(  2=3) and the nonnegativity constraint on r is not binding, the
equilibrium tax rates in both regime types are (for di¤erent reasons) insensitive to the level of
distortions. However, because the equilibrium level of taxation is higher in the parliamentary
regime, the overall e¤ect of the tax distortions on the size of government, via state capacity,
19The full derivation is provided in the proof of Proposition A2 in the Appendix.
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is stronger in the parliamentary regime. If the nonnegativity constraint on r is binding, the
comparative e¤ects of the tax distortions are shown to be indecisive.
Second, if tax distortions are high ( > 2=3), the distortions are fully internalized in the
determination of the equilibrium tax rate in the parliamentary regime. In the presidential regime,
the tax distortions are only internalized in the special case when there is no redistribution in
equilibrium. Hence, economic distortions have stronger e¤ects for the equilibrium tax rate in the
parliamentary regime, and the distortions are even fully internalized when the level of distortion
is su¢ ciently high ( > 2=3).
As a consequence of the di¤erences in incentives between the two regimes to internalize the
distortionary costs of taxation in policymaking, the main insight from Persson et al. (2000)
that the size of government is smaller with a presidential than with a parliamentary form of
government is no longer generally valid. The conditions for this result to break down are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When  > 2=3,  > 3=7, and the nonnegativity constraint on r is not binding,
the size of government in the equilibrium of the parliamentary regime is smaller than the size of
government in the presidential regime.
Proof. Consider the equilibrium tax rates in the two regime types (as discussed above, and
precisely dened in Propositions A2 and A3 in the Appendix). When  > 2=3 and the nonnega-
tivity constraint on r in the equilibrium of the presidential regime is not binding, the di¤erence
between the size of government in the presidential and the parliamentary regime is given by
3C   3P = 3

1  
1 + 2=3
  1  
1  =3  
1
3 (1  )H
 1
g

1
3 (1  )

;
where 3C and 3P are the total amount of tax revenues from the three constituencies in the
two regimes. If the preference structure is such that the equilibrium provision of public goods is
su¢ ciently low, H 1g

1
3(1 )

 ! 0, then  2 (3=7; 1) is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for 
C   P  to be positive.
Note that if, more realistically, H 1g

1
3(1 )

> 0,  2 (3=7; 1) is a necessary, but not a
su¢ cient, condition for
 
C   P  to be positive. In this latter case, an even more restrictive
condition on , depending on the shape of H (g), is required to get C > P .
In other words, when there are high ine¢ ciencies from taxation, legislators are patient, and
citizens attach a su¢ ciently low value to the consumption of public goods relative to private
goods, the size of government will be larger in the presidential regime than in the parliamentary
regime.
The intuition behind this result is that the perceived relative price of redistributionary policies
is lower in the presidential regime than in the parliamentary regime: when ag decides on gC and
rC , the only cost of redistribution is the opportunity cost of public goods consumption. The
coalition government of the parliamentary regime, however, decides on the entire policy vector
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simultaneously, and thus provides its voters with stronger incentives to internalize the distortions
of taxation. In particular, when  > 2=3, the marginal costs of redistribution, as perceived by
the governments voters, are higher than the marginal benets, providing the voters with strong
incentives to abstain from levying taxes for the pure purpose of redistribution.
Intuitively, even if the economic conditions are such that the equilibrium levels of redistrib-
ution and public goods provision will be higher in the presidential regime (i.e., with a high level
of tax distortion, relatively weak preferences for public relative to private goods, and relatively
patient legislators), it is still the case that the level of diversion, due to the underlying threat
of a government crisis, will be higher in the parliamentary regime. It is hence not trivial that
the equilibrium tax rate should be higher in the presidential regime than in the parliamentary
regime. To see why this is still the case, recall that when a sets the tax rate, she takes into
account that the probability of her becoming a member of the winning coalition at the public
expenditures stage of the game is less than one. Since the legislators discount their expected
future payo¤s with the probability of being in the winning coalition, taxes must be set higher in
the presidential regime than in the parliamentary regime for incentive compatibility to hold, so
that the legislators are willing to go along with the equilibrium.
4.4 Extension: convex tax costs
The theoretical analysis above assumed that the tax cost function, c (; ), was linear in the tax
rate, and, more specically, that c (; ) =  . In reality, tax distortions may be nonlinear, and
are often assumed to be convex in the tax rate (or, alternatively, in the overall level of taxation).
Allowing for convexity makes the analytical derivations less tractable; however, the main insights
and results do not change. In the following extension, we substitute the baseline specication of
the tax costs with a convex function, such that now c (; ) = 2. Apart from this modication,
the model, the equilibrium denition, and the procedure to solve for the respective equilibria,
are all the same as before.
First, consider the equilibrium of the parliamentary regime. The voters of the parliamentary
government demand taxes be raised up to the point where the marginal redistributional benet
from taxation equates the marginal cost via the tax bill. When the distortionary costs of taxation
were linear, the marginal tax costs could not be reduced by lowering the tax rate, which resulted
in a discrete jump in the tax rate from one to the minimum incentive compatible tax rate when
the marginal tax cost, , exceeded the tax cost threshold. If tax costs are convex, however, the
marginal costs from tax distortions, c0  dc(;)d = 2 , will be an increasing function of the
equilibrium tax rates. Without loss of generality and to facilitate comparison with the linear
case, assume for now that  2 [0; 1) as in the case of linear distortions.20 In contrast to the case
with linear tax costs, the equilibrium tax rate will now move continuously, rather than jump
discontinuously, towards the minimum incentive compatible rate as the marginal distortions of
taxation increase.
20This assumption can easily be relaxed without qualitatively a¤ecting the results.
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The revenue-maximizing tax rate associated with the quadratic tax cost function is  =
min

1; 12

, which, by the same techniques as before, implies an incentive compatible level of
diversion sP = min
h
3(1 )
2(1 =3) ;
3(1 )
4(1 =3)
i
.21 The equilibrium level of diversion sP is, as in the
linear case, decreasing in both  and . The value of sP constitutes a lower bound for the
size of government in the parliamentary system. Dene the minimum equilibrium tax rate,
P , as the one that exactly nances sP ; P is then implicitly dened by 3P
 
1  P  =
min
h
3(1 )
2(1 =3) ;
3(1 )
4(1 =3)
i
. Consequently, P solves
P
 
1  P  = min  1  
2 (1  =3) ;
1  
4 (1  =3)

. (7)
As with linear distortions, the voters of a strong coalition partner will demand redistribution
to cease if the marginal distortionary tax cost exceeds a threshold level such that c0 > c0, where
c0 2 [1=3; 2=3] depends on the intra-governmental bargaining outcome, as before. Note that
c0 is associated with a specic tax rate   c02 . Thus, there exist two bounds, an upper and
a lower, for the tax rate threshold , where the upper bound is dened as   13 , and the
lower bound is dened as  16 . Hence, as before there exist multiple equilibria depending on
the outcome of the Nash bargaining game over redistribution. If the threshold is not binding,
meaning  < P , and at the same time H 1g ()  ! 0, then P  !P . If the threshold is
binding, such that  > P , then P = , implying that P  P .
Turning to the presidential equilibrium, and using the same procedure to solve for the equi-
librium policy vector, the equilibrium tax rate is the one that solves
C
 
1  C = min  1  =3
2 (1 + 2=3)
;
1  =3
4 (1 + 2=3)

: (8)
The equilibrium tax di¤erential between the two regime types, under the assumption that
H 1g ()  ! 0, is now given by
C   P = 1
(1  C)

min

1  =3
2 (1 + 2=3)
;
1  =3
4 (1 + 2=3)

  1
(1  P )

min

1  
2 (1  =3) ;
1  
4 (1  =3)

;
where C solves (8) and P solves (7). Due to the complex nature of the nonlinearities in
(7) and (8), the conditions for the size of government to be larger in the presidential than in
the parliamentary regime cannot be evaluated analytically. A graphical evaluation is, however,
available, as shown in gures 13.22 In gures 13, the solid, thin curve represents the presidential
tax rate, C , and the solid, thick curve is the minimum size of the parliamentary tax rate, P .
21Note that the tax rate can never exceed one; hence the upper bound on sP is implicitly dened by 1
2
=
1()  = 0:5.
22The gures are produced using the mathematical software in Scientic WorkPlace, version 5.50, MacKichan
Software, Inc.
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Note that only the lower set of solid curves can constitute an equilibrium: The higher curves,
involving a higher level of taxation for any given vector (; ) in both regimes types can never
be consistent with the reservation utilities of the respective voters, since the voters would always
demand the lowest possible tax rate that is consistent with the incentive-compatibility constraints
of their respective legislators (and also with the preferred provision of public goods and level of
redistribution). Furthermore, the upper dashed line in the gures is the 2/3 threshold,  , and
lower dashed line is the 1/3 threshold,  . Thus,  is somewhere in the interval between the  -
and the  curves, and the exact location follows from the intra-governmental Nash bargaining in
the parliamentary regime.
In gures 1, 2, and 3,  is (arbitrarily) set to 0:1, 0:6, and 0:8, respectively, to illustrate
three qualitatively di¤erent sets of equilibria. It can be veried from the gures that the more
myopic politicians are (i.e., the lower is ), the higher are the equilibrium tax rates. Moreover,
the curves conrm that in the range where the tax costs represent a constraint on the revenue-
maximizing tax rate (i.e., when  > 0:5), the equilibrium tax rates are falling in the tax cost
parameter  throughout. To the left of this point (i.e., when   0:5), however, the revenue
maximizing tax rate is equal to one independent of the value of . Hence, in this interval, the
equilibrium tax rates must be increasing in the level of distortion for the government revenues
to be high enough to satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint. The curves of C and P are
thus characterized by a peak at the point where, in an out-of-equilibrium history, government
revenues are just maximized by setting the tax rate equal to one (i.e., moving to the right of this
point, revenue-maximization implies a tax rate strictly lower than one due to the convexity of
the tax distortions).
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Figure 1. Equilibrium tax rates for =0.1. The thick, solid line is the P -curve, the thin, solid line is the
C -curve, and the upper and lower dashed lines are the 2/3 and the 1/3 thresholds, respectively.
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Figure 2. Equilibrium tax rates for =0.6. The thick, solid line is the P -curve, the thin, solid line is the
C -curve, and the upper and lower dashed lines are the 2/3 and the 1/3 thresholds, respectively.
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Figure 3. Equilibrium tax rates for =0.8. The thick, solid line is the P -curve, the thin, solid line is the
C -curve, and the upper and lower dashed lines are the 2/3 and the 1/3 thresholds, respectively.
Figures 13 demonstrate (at least) three qualitatively di¤erent sets of equilibria, dependent
on the value of the parameter :
1. C < P <  when the value of  is lower than the intersection between the P -curve and
the  curve; otherwise  < C < P .
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2. P < C <  when the value of  is lower than the intersection between the C-curve and
the  curve, otherwise P <  < C .
3. P < C <  8 .
In the rst set of equilibria, as seen in Figure 1, the equilibria in the parliamentary regime
where  < P imply that the equilibrium tax rate is set just so that it nances the incentive
compatible level of diversion and the socially optimal level of public goods. The size of govern-
ment is then unambiguously larger with a parliamentary rather than with a presidential form
of government (in the gure, C < P ). The equilibria where  > P entail positive levels of
redistribution, hence the distance between the equilibrium size of government in the two regimes, 
P   C, is even larger.
In the second set of equilibria, as illustrated in Figure 2, it can (but need not), be the
case that the equilibrium size of government is smaller in the parliamentary regime, i.e., that
P < C (since, in the gure, P < ).23 In particular, this can be an equilibrium outcome
for higher values of  (i.e.,  & 0:5), but not for lower (meaning to the left of the intersection
between the thick, solid line and the dashed  -curve). Note that in the region where P <  ,
the parliamentary equilibrium can depending on the whether the nonnegativity condition on
redistribution is binding (which, in turn, depends on the preferences for public goods) involve
both a positive level of public goods provision and a positive level of redistribution, even when
P < C .
Finally, in the third set of equilibria, as illustrated in Figure 3, the minimum size of gov-
ernment in the parliamentary regime is smaller than in the presidential equilibrium. However,
because  > C , the equilibrium level of redistribution and/or public goods provision will be so
high in the parliamentary regime that, in equilibrium, P > C .
In sum, the main result from employing a convex tax cost function conrms the main re-
sult from the baseline analysis with linear tax costs in either case, and in contrary to the case
without distortions (i.e., with c () = 0), there exist equilibria in which either of the regime
types produces a smaller (or larger) size of government. However, while in the case of linear
distortions the parliamentary regime was more likely to produce a smaller size of government
only when the marginal costs of taxation were high and when politicians were not myopic, with
convex costs the parliamentary regime can be smaller only with intermediate levels of political
myopia (in particular, if 0:41 .  . 0:63): If there is a higher degree of myopia, the size of
government is relatively larger in the parliamentary system because politicians demand higher
levels of diversion, compared to the presidential system, in order to stay on the equilibrium path;
if there is a lower degree of myopia, on the other hand, the equilibrium tax rates and levels of
distortion are so low that the parliamentary equilibrium entails relatively much higher levels of
redistribution (and/or public goods provision if the nonnegativity constraint on redistribution
is binding). With intermediate levels of myopia, however, as illustrated in Figure 2, the equi-
23The specic condition for this is  < C .
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librium minimum incentive-compatible tax rate in the parliamentary regime will be lower than
the equilibrium tax rate in the presidential regime, but high enough for redistribution to be shut
down if the government is characterized by relatively equally powerful coalition partners (i.e., if
 is relatively close to 16 ).
5 Some evidence and discussion
5.1 OECD panel data evidence
One of the theorys main predictions is that the size of government should be more responsive
to the distortionary e¤ects of taxation if the form of government is parliamentary as opposed to
presidential. Consequently, indicators of tax distortion are expected to exert a negative impact
on the size of government in parliamentary regimes, but less so in presidential regimes.
Several proxies are suggested in the literature as indicators for the level of distortions from
taxation. Many of these are available only for a small cross-section countries (mostly subsamples
of OECD countries).24 One available proxy for tax e¢ ciency for which there is su¢ cient variation
over time, however, is the marginal tax wedges on wage earnings in the OECD, i.e., the di¤erence
between labor costs to the employer and the net take-home pay of the employee, including any
cash benets from government welfare programs.25 This variable is available for a panel of 30
OECD countries during the period from 2000 to 2008.
The government can be expected to pay attention to behavioral responses in the economy
associated with changes in the tax wedge, and to respond accordingly. As an increase in the
marginal tax wedge for a given average tax rate will be associated with a higher level of economic
distortions from taxation, an optimal response would, ceteris paribus, be to decrease the size of
government. As the tax-wedge variable is a complex and composite outcome measure, it is likely
to be observed with a time lag.
To estimate the association between the level of tax distortion, proxied by an indicator of
the marginal tax wedge, on the (contemporaneous) size of government, the following empirical
model was employed,
TAXGDPit = i +
1X
j=0
jWEDGEit j + PRES WEDGEit 1 +X0it + Zt + uit; (9)
where TAXGDPit is the total tax revenue as percentage of GDP,26 WEDGEit j is the marginal
24Becker and Mulligan (2003) provide an overview of the di¤erent proxies for tax e¢ ciency that have been
proposed in the literature. These include agricultural dependence (Becker and Mulligan 1998), modernization
(Peltzman 1980), corporatism(Summers et al. 1993; Alesina and Perotti 1997), and population and per capita
income (Easterly and Rebelo 1993). In addition, Becker and Mulligan (2003) suggest using the revenue raised
by social security, payroll, and sales taxes, as a ratio to other tax revenue; and the ratio of the economy-wide
average individual income tax rate to the top statutory individual income tax.
25The variable is collected from the OECD dataset Taxing Wages: <http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/taxation/data/oecd-tax-statistics_tax-data-en>.
26The TAXGDPit-variable is the "Revenue, excluding grants"-variable from the World Development Indicators,
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tax wedge in the two periods t and t  1, PRES WEDGEit 1 is an interaction term between
the presidential indicator and the one-year lagged tax wedge indicator, and X0it is the transpose
of the vector of control variables.27 Furthermore, Zt is a time indicator, and uit is an error
term assumed to be i.i.d.. The vector of constitutional indicators contains dummy variables
for the constitutional features of the form of government (presidential regimes: PRES = 1;
parliamentary regimes: PRES = 0) and the electoral system (majoritarian systems: MAJ = 1;
proportional systems: MAJ = 0).28
Table 1 shows the results from using model (1) to estimate the relationship between the tax
wedge and the size of government. The rst three columns (columns (1)(3)) display the between
estimates, that is the cross-section estimates resulting from averaging the variables within the
countries, while the latter ve columns (columns (4)(8)) display country xed e¤ects estimates.
Furthermore, a trend term is included in columns (6)(8), while columns (7) and (8) also include
time xed e¤ects.
Reading Table 1 from left to right, a rst observation is that the regression results indicate
that in the pure cross-section (i.e., in the between estimates) both the tax wedge and the average
income tax rate are positively associated with the size of government. This is not surprising,
as average and marginal tax rates are likely to be correlated. However, controlling for the level
of income, trade openness, and demographic composition, the (contemporaneous) tax wedge
variable is no longer signicant, indicating that this variable correlates with the controls, and
in particular with the share of elderly in the population (PROP65). Adding the constitutional
dummies, there is further indication that the (contemporaneous) tax wedge is not a statistically
signicant determinant of the size of government, while the results on the constitutional features
correspond well with the existing ndings in the literature: presidential forms of government
and measures the central government revenue, excluding grants, as % of GDP. While having a federal structure
may a¤ect the incentives of the central government and hence policy outcomes, there are several reasons for
focusing on the size of the central, rather than the general, government in the current context. First, the theory
abstracts from the interplay between di¤erent levels of government, and addresses the incentives implicit in the
central governments legislative process. Second, the related empirical literature has focused on the central level of
government, hence, doing the same here facilitates comparison with this literature. Third, panel data on central
government revenues and expenditures is both more reliable and available than general government data, and
general government expenditures and revenues are often not comparable across countries and over time. Persson
and Tabellini (2003: 3738), who discuss this issue much more in detail, report a very high (about 0.9) correlation
coe¢ cient between the size of the central and general government, and also nd that centralization of spending
(measured as the ratio between central and general government spending) is not correlated with the form of
government.
27The control variables are those that have been found to be most closely correlated with the size of governments
across countries (see Persson and Tabellini 2003), and include: the level of per capita income (measured in
purchasing power parities), openness (approximated by a trade-in-GDP variable, measuring the value of exports
and import as a percent of GDP), and demographic composition (i.e., the share of the population between 15 and
64 years of age, and the share above 64 years). Data on per capita income and the share of trade in GDP is from
the OECD: <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/>, while the demographic variables are from the WDI (World Bank):
<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>.
28The constitutional classication is adopted from Persson and Tabellini (2003), and classies presidential
[Presidential = 1] only as regimes in which the condence of the legislative assembly is not necessary for the
executive to stay in power (even if an elected president is not chief executive, or even if there is no elected
president. Majoritarian regimes [Majoritarian = 1] are those in which all the members of the lower house in a
country are elected under plurality rule. See Persson and Tabellini (2003) for further details about the classication
and sources.
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Table 1: Tax Wedges and the Size of Government in OECD, 2000 to 2008: BE and FE-estimates.
Est. method BE BE BE FE FE FE FE1 FE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
WEDGE 0.31 0.18 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.08)** (0.11) (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
AV:INC:TAX 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.15
(0.13)** (0.14)** (0.15)** (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)*
PRES -3.96
(2.79)
MAJ -2.31
(2.23)
L:WEDGE -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)* (0.03)*
L:WEDGE_PRES 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.17
(0.08)* (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)*
L:WEDGE_MAJ 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09
(0.05)* (0.05)* (0.05)* (0.05)
INCOME=CAPITA 0.02 0.02 -0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)**
TRADE=GDP 0.02 0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)**
PROP1564 0.01 -0.08 0.20
(0.49) (0.49) (0.22)
PROP65 0.61 0.64 0.23
(0.32)* (0.32)* (0.32)
Time - - - No No Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 266 266 266 236 236 236 236 236
# Countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
R2 0.69 0.75 0.78 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.21
Note: BE and FE are the between and the xed e¤ects estimators, where superscript "1" indicates that year
xed e¤ects are included. Standard errors in parentheses. * and ** indicate statistical signicance at 5% and 1%,
respectively. In the BE-regressions, the R-squared statistic refers to the between variation, while it refers to the
within variation in the FE-regressions.
and majoritarian systems are both negatively correlated with the size of government (albeit not
statistically signicant in this small cross-section of countries). As expected, the average income
tax rate is positively correlated with the level of government tax revenues (statistically signicant
at the 1% level).
It was argued above that tax wedges are likely to a¤ect policy with a lag, due to informational
delays in the policymaking process. The regressions in columns (4) through (8) exploit the
panels time dimension to investigate this hypothesis. Note that all ve of these regressions
employ country xed e¤ects, hence any potential time-invariant idiosyncrasies associated with
the size of government should be accounted for. As a consequence, as the constitutional dummies
are time-invariant within the present sample of countries and years, these are absorbed in the
country xed e¤ects and are hence not included as separate regressors in the specications.
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Column (4) is a rst take on estimating the e¤ect of the one-year lagged tax wedge variable,
and the results suggest that the e¤ect is negative, as expected, but not statistically signicant
at any conventional level of signicance. Moreover, regression (4) has only limited explanatory
power, as it is capable of explaining no more than 2% of the total within-country variation in
the size of government tax receipts (as indicated by the R2-statistic).
In Column (5), the tax wedge variable interacts with the dummy for a presidential form
of government. In addition, a dummy for the electoral system is also included. The results
reported in Column (5) suggest that constitutional features indeed appear to be signicant
determinants. For the default category, which are the countries with a parliamentary form of
government and a proportional electoral system, the lagged tax wedge variable is associated
with a negative e¤ect, signicant at the 10 % level of signicance. The point estimate,  0:05,
implies that a 10-percentage point increase in the marginal tax wedge leads to a reduction in
the size of government of about 0.5 percentage points in the following year. This result can
be interpreted as an indication that countries with a parliamentary form of government and a
proportional electoral rule to a larger extent internalize the deadweight losses associated with
high marginal tax wedges. Examining the result in Column (4) on the e¤ect of a presidential
form of government, the estimate suggests that the e¤ect of the marginal tax wedge on the size
of government is positive ( 0:05 + 0:16 = 0:11). This latter e¤ect, however, is not robust, as it
critically hinges on the inclusion of the electoral rule that is not included in the specication (this
regression not displayed in the table). Similarly, the point estimate of the interaction between
the majoritarian dummy and the tax wedge variable also suggests the majoritarian systems are
less responsive to tax costs than the parliamentary-proportional systems.
In Columns (5) through (8), the robustness of the constitutional e¤ects are investigated
further: rst, by adding a trend variable to account for common trends in scal policy; second,
by adding year xed e¤ects to make sure that the e¤ects are not driven by any single year
specic shocks, and; third, by adding the whole battery of controls. The results suggest that
the constitutional e¤ects, and in particular the e¤ects associated with the form of government,
are robust to these specications. The constitutional e¤ects are signicant at the 5-% level of
signicance, and their contribution in the regressions is to increase the overall explanatory power
(as indicated by the R2-statistic) of the model by some 5%, going from 2% to 7%. In the full
specication (Column (8)), the constitutional e¤ects accounts for some 20% of the explained
variation, as these increase the R2 from 17 to 21 (regression not displayed). For comparison,
this contribution is stronger than the contribution of any of the groups of control variables: per
capita income, trade, and the demography variables. Decomposing the constitutional e¤ects,
the form of government contributes to the explanatory power of the model by some 3% of the
total variation in the full specication, while the contribution of the electoral system is some
2%. The evidence is hence suggestive that out of the two constitutional variables, the form of
government can potentially explain more of the total variation in the e¤ect of the lagged tax
wedge indicator on the size of government tax revenues across countries than can any of the
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other included regressors.
5.2 Cross-country patterns in the growth and variability of the size of
government
Reviewing the literature, it appears: (1) that the growth in the size of government indeed has been
much stronger in countries with a parliamentary form of government (Persson and Tabellini 2003;
Becker and Mulligan 2003); and, (2) that taxation has become more e¢ cient over time.29 The
former pattern is illustrated in Figure 1, plotting the size of government in eight parliamentary
and seven presidential countries between 1960 and 1998.30 Observation (1), given the robust-
ness of (2), is consistent with the notion that the size of government in parliamentary regimes
is more responsive to changes in the distortions from taxation than in presidential regimes, un-
der the assumption that the tax distortions are not systematically associated with the form of
government. The possibility that distortions of taxation could be systematically correlated with
the form of government can be investigated empirically by considering the distribution of top
statutory marginal tax rates across regime types. The data is indicative that this does not seem
to be the case.31
29Cross-country panels on key indicators of the distortions from taxation are not available in the literature. Less
direct measures, however, indicate a decline over time (as suggested by Becker and Mulligan 2003). One reason
why taxation has become more e¢ cient is the increased use of the value-added tax (VAT), which constitute:
more or less at taxes that raise government revenue more e¢ ciently (Becker and Mulligan 2003, p. 304).
Additionally, technological constraints are negatively correlated with development, which has a positive trend in
most developed countries (Peltzman 1980). Although cross-country panels on tax distortions are scarce in supply,
extensive research has been done on U.S. data to construct long time series on comprehensive marginal tax rates.
Within the time range in the present paper (19601998), there is evidence of a decrease in the average marginal
e¤ective income tax rate after 1981, and in the average marginal Social Security tax rate after 1978 (Stephenson
1998). Moreover, the average marginal tax rates were between 1 and 2 percentage points higher in 1960 than in
1994. In sum, the evidence in the literature is not conclusive, but there seems to be considerable support for a
fall in the distortionary costs of taxation over time.
30The sample is based on the panel data in Persson and Tabellini (2003), and consists of all the countries
for which there is data available over the whole time period of their panel (196098). The eight parliamentary
countries in the sample are: Finland, Greece, India, Italy, Malaysia, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. The seven presidential countries are: Chile, Equador, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, the United States,
and Venezuela. The reader is referred to Persson and Tabellini (2003) for a more precise denition of the regime
classication and data sample.
31Tables 5 through 7 in the online appendix <http://www.bi.no/en/Research/Academic-
homepage/?ansattid=/a0810301> presents summary statistics on top statutory marginal tax rates across
regime types in the period 1960-1998, which is indicative that the two are not robustly correlated. Data on the
highest marginal corporate- and individual income taxes are available in the World Banks WDI database, albeit
not earlier than 1998.
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Figure 4
In addition to the indications of the stark di¤erences in the growth of government, Figure
1 is suggestive of a higher variability in the size of government among the parliamentary than
among the presidential systems. The statistics presented in Table 2 documents the patterns seen
in Figure 1, and shows that the mean percentage growth in the size of government, measured
as the ratio of central government expenditures to GDP (cgexp), over the period 1960 to 1998
(d6098), was almost ve times stronger (63.1% versus 13.0%) in the subsample of parliamentary
systems compared with the presidential systems. Moreover, by 1960 the variation in the size of
government was already somewhat higher among the parliamentary countries (with a standard
deviation of 6.9, versus 5.7 among the presidential countries), and grew to more than three times
as high by 1998 (9.7% versus 2.9%).
The upper panel of Table 3 expands the sample to include all the countries for which there
exist annual data for either 1960 and 1998, implying the 1960-samples and the 1998-samples
have di¤erent compositions, while the lower panel (indicated by an asterisk) only includes OECD
countries. The total sample size in the upper panel is 19 in 1960 and 46 in 1998, of which about
two-thirds are parliamentary countries. The subsample of OECD countries in the lower panel is
smaller, with only 10 countries in 1960, and 16 countries in 1998. Note that the United States is
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Table 2: Summary statistics for relative size of government on a time-consistent sample.
Presidential Parliamentary
1960 1998 d6098 (%) 1960 1998 d6098 (%)
Mean cgexp 17.7 (7) 20.0 (7) 13.0 19.8 (8) 32.3 (8) 63.1
St.dev. cgexp 5.7 2.9 6.9 9.7
Note: The parentheses indicate sample size.
Table 3: Growth and Variation in the Size of Government in Presidential and Parliamentary
Systems.
Presidential Parliamentary
1960 1998 d6098 (%) 1960 1998 d6098 (%)
Mean cgexp 16.8 (8) 20.3 (19) 21.0 21.2 (11) 32.4 (27) 47.4
St.dev. cgexp 5.9 5.4 7.7 9.8
Mean cgexp 17.5 (1) 20.9 (3) 19.5 23.6 (9) 35.3 (15) 49.8
St.dev. cgexp 6.8 6.1 6.9
Note: The parentheses indicate sample size.  indicates that the sample is restricted to include only member
countries of the OECD.
the only presidential country in the OECD sample in 1960; in 1998 Mexico and Switzerland are
added to the sample of presidential countries. The numbers in Table 3 indicate that the average
percentage growth in the size of government (d6098) was more than twice as high in the group
of parliamentary countries than in the group of presidential countries. In the group of OECD
countries the di¤erence in the growth of government is somewhat larger (49.8% versus 20.9%).
The evidence in Table 3 also illustrates large di¤erences in the within-regime variation of the size
of government; in 1998, the standard deviation in the size of government was more than 70%
larger among the parliamentary countries than among the presidential countries.
The cross-sectional sample of OECD countries is clearly too small to facilitate rigorous sta-
tistical inference, even if a precise measure of tax distortion was available. One particular worry
is that the two groups of countries di¤er substantially in their overall quality of institutions
and level of democracy. Table 4 addresses this issue by limiting the sample to include only those
countries that did not experience nondemocratic episodes in the period between 1960 and 1998.32
Again the numbers clearly indicate a much stronger growth in the size of government among the
parliamentary countries.
In sum, the evidence in Tables 24 seems to be consistent with the models main predictions.
The average growth in the size of government, which coincides with indications of an overall
increase in the e¢ ciency of taxation, has been much stronger in countries with a parliamentary
form of government as opposed to a presidential form of government. Moreover, the relatively
higher variability in the size of governments among the parliamentary countries suggests that
32Nondemocratic episodes here refer to years in which the Polity IV-score is negative (Marshall and Jaggers
2009).
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Table 4: Growth and Variation in the Size of Government: Strictly Democratic Sample.
Presidential countries Parliamentary countries
1970 1998 d7098 1970 1998 d7098
Mean cgexp 19.5 (4) 21.6 (4) 10.7 26.4 (13) 35.3 (13) 33.7
St.dev. cgexp 5.2 2.5 2.4 11.1
Note: The parentheses indicate sample size.
these regimes are much more sensitive to variation in the underlying determinants of the size of
governments when the e¢ ciency of the tax system are included.
5.3 Interpretation
The empirical patterns discussed above appear consistent with the proposed theory. The empir-
ical analysis should not, however, be accorded a causal interpretation. The data and empirical
inference is thus suggestive, but not conclusive, that the proposed theory is consistent with ob-
served patterns, and the current theoretical analysis and predictions may serve as a candidate
hypothesis to understand these empirical regularities.
There do indeed exist a large number of competing and/or supplementary hypotheses and
theories on growth in the size of government. The alternative theories on the size of government
found in the literature include: the hypothesis of an increasing price and an inelastic demand for
government (Baumol 1967); the insurance aspect of government programs in the face of the risk
that accompanies an open economy (Rodrik 1998); the idea that new entrants into the voting
population are lower income workers who demand higher taxes and redistribution (Meltzer and
Richard 1981, 1983); the higher cost of political support that follows social and economic equal-
ization (Peltzman 1980); the formation and pressure from interest groups (Olson 1965, Becker
1983); the pressure of government agents to maximize the size of their agenciesbudgets (Niska-
nen 1971); the expansionary dynamics of political succession (Kimenyi and Shughart 1989); the
internal dynamics which may follow from the mechanism that larger bureaus can better manip-
ulate their budgets relative to smaller bureaus (Mueller 2003); scal illusion (Buchanan 1967);
y-paper e¤ects (Hines and Thaler 1995); and the monopoly view of government (Brennan
and Buchanan 1977). Some of these theories are partially taken into account in the panel data
investigation above, such as the role of openness (c.f. the inclusion of the TRADE variable in
the panel regressions). However, many of these theories are di¢ cult to account for empirically
(due to data scarcity), and some may also be closely associated with the particular form of
government.
Most of the determinants of the size of government surveyed above can potentially explain
some of the observed variation in the size of government across countries, or within specic
countries over time. It is less clear whether these variables can o¤er a plausible explanation
for the strong divergence in the growth of government between parliamentary and presidential
systems since the 1960s. For example, one compelling hypothesis is that cross-country di¤erences
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in public policy has a deeper cultural determinants associated with cross-country variations in
preferences. Alesina and his various coauthors (Alesina et al. 2004; Alesina and Angeletos 2005;
Alesina and La Ferrara 2005) nd that preferences or, the beliefs about the fairness of social
competition (see also Kristov et al. 1992) can explain U.S. vis-a-vis continental European
perceptions about income inequality and choices of redistributive policies. Such di¤erences will
in turn be reected in the size and composition of government, and are hence a candidate
explanation for the variation in public policy across countries. This hypothesis is, however, less
capable of explaining why the size of government has grown so much faster in Europe (in fact,
almost three times as fast in Europe than in the United States during the 19601998 period),
unless preference and belief di¤erentials have changed substantially over the past 40 or so years.
This is not very plausible.
6 Concluding remarks
By taking into account the economic distortions associated with taxation, the present analysis
demonstrated that if the marginal distortion exceeded some endogenously dened threshold,
which is an equilibrium outcome in the model, the presidential form of government could be
associated with a larger size of government than the parliamentary form of government.
This result contrasts with the existing theorys prediction that presidential systems unam-
biguously promote a smaller size of government than do parliamentary systems. The reason for
the di¤erent results is the very di¤erent incentives the two political systems promote when it
comes to the internalization of two fundamentally di¤erent sources of tax costs. While the presi-
dential regime type entails a comparatively stronger incentive to hold legislators accountable for
the diversionary costs of taxation, the broader representation under the parliamentary system
provides a stronger incentive to internalize the distortionary costs of taxation. This di¤erence
may suggest an institutional tradeo¤ associated with accountability: by creating incentives to
hold the legislators accountable for economic diversion through the dispersion of agenda-setting
powers, the incentives for holding the same agenda setters accountable for the economic distor-
tions of taxation may be weakened.
The present analysis has several limitations, which also constitute interesting avenues for
future research. First, di¤erent tax systems may interact in di¤erent ways with di¤erent political
systems. Second, panel data on tax e¢ ciency is scarce and incomplete. As indicators of tax
e¢ ciency continue to be developed, however, the prospect of future empirical research within
this eld is indeed promising. Third, the form of government may interact with other features
of the politico-economic environment, such as the federal structure (Olson 1969), the electoral
rules (Persson et al. 2007), or lobbying (Helpman and Persson 2001). Finally, not only the level
of taxation, but also the tax systems, may indeed be endogenous to the political institutions.
Besley and Persson (2007) show how legal and scal capacity are determined endogenously in
an intertemporal game between present and future governments, and note that: we should see
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more investment in legal and scal capacity in such [ref. parliamentary] democracies (p.17).
This is yet to be demonstrated, but could potentially work both as to enforce and to mitigate
the mechanism investigated in the present analysis.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Theory
8.1.1 The simple legislature
See the online appendix<http://www.bi.no/en/Research/Academic-homepage/?ansattid=/a0810301>
for the denition (Denition A1) and the equilibrium (Proposition A1) of the simple legislature.
8.1.2 Equilibrium in the presidential regime type33
Denition A2 An equilibrium of the presidential regime type is a vector of policies
qCt (bt) =

Ct (bt) ; g
C
t
 
Ct (bt) ; bt

;

siCt
 
Ct (bt) ; bt
	
;

riCt
 
Ct (bt) ; bt
	
;
and a vector of reservation utilities bCt , such that, in any period t, when all players take as given
the equilibrium outcomes of periods t+ k; k  1:
(I) for any given bt, at stage 4, at least one legislator i 6= a weakly prefers accepting rather
than rejecting proposal Ct to any other  t given the expected equilibrium proposals and decisions
at stages 5 and 6;
(II) for any given bt, a prefers proposing Ct to any other  t satisfying (I), given the expected
equilibrium proposals and decisions at stages 5 and 6, to any other policy satisfying part (I);
(III) for any given bt and  t at stage 6, at least one legislator i 6= ag weakly prefers accepting
rather than rejecting the proposal
gCt
 
Ct (bt) ; bt

;

siCt
 
Ct (bt) ; bt
	
;

riCt
 
Ct (bt) ; bt
	
;
33Note that the equilibrium in Proposition 1 also encompasses the case where citizens possess strong preferences
for public goods, which is excluded from the discussion of the equilibrium in Persson et al. (2000).
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(IV) for any given bt and  t, at stage 5, ag prefers the proposal
gCt
 
Ct (bt) ; bt

;

siCt
 
Ct (bt) ; bt
	
;

riCt
 
Ct (bt) ; bt
	
to any other proposal satisfying condition (III) and the budget constraint;
(V) the reservation utilities biCt are optimal for the voters, in each district i, when one takes
into account that policies in the current period will be set according to qCt (bt) and takes as
given the reservation utilities in other regions b iCt as well as the identities of a and ag.
Proposition A2 The equilibrium in the presidential regime is characterized by the following
equilibrium policy vector:
C =
8>>><>>>:
1  
(1+ 23 )
if nonnegativity on r is not binding; otherwise :
min
h
1; 1 =32(1 )H
 1
g (1)
i
if 1 =32(1 )  1; or :
min
h
1; 1 =32(1 )H
 1
g

1 =3
2(1 )
i
if 1 =32(1 ) > 1
; (10)
sC =
8>><>>:
3(1 )(1 )
1+2=3 if nonnegativity on r is not binding; otherwise :
min
h
3(1 )
2 H
 1
g (1) ;
3(1 )(1 )
1 =3
i
if 1 =32(1 )  1; or :
min
h
3(1 )
2 H
 1
g

1 =3
2(1 )

; 3(1 )(1 )1 =3
i
if 1 =32(1 ) > 1
; (11)
gC =
8<: min
h
H 1g (1) ;
2(1 )
1+2=3
i
if nonneg: on r is not binding; or 1 =32(1 )  1
min
h
H 1g

1 =3
2(1 )

; 2(1 )1 =3
i
if 1 =32(1 ) > 1
; (12)
rC =
(
2(1 )
1+ 23 
  gC
0 if nonnegativity on r is binding
; (13)
bagC =
(
H
 
gC
  gC + 2(1 )
1+ 23 
if rC > 0 and 1 =32(1 )  1
H
 
gC

otherwise
; (14)
baC =
8<: H
 
H 1g (1)

if 1 =32(1 )  1
H

H 1g

1 =3
2(1 )

otherwise
; (15)
biC = H
 
gC

; i 6= ag; a : (16)
All politicians are reelected.
Proof. Voters a are not direct residual claimants of public funds and demand the lowest
incentive compatible tax rate, given that the tax revenues are high enough to nance their
optimal choice of public goods provision under the actual institutional constraints.
The tax rate is constrained downward by the legislatorsincentive compatibility constraints.
All legislators i 6= ag are in the winning coalition (on stages 5 and 6) in any subgame with a
probability of 1=2. If the nonnegativity constraint on r is not binding, the same argument as in
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the proof of Proposition A1 implies that agenda setter ag must get (taking  as given) at least
sag  2 (1  )   W , o¤ering smg =  (1  )   W to the junior partner, mg. For this o¤er
to be incentive-compatible, smg must satisfy smg=2 + W  vd, where vd = 12 (1  ) represents
the expected payo¤ in a disequilibrium history with maximized taxes and diversion. W is the
equilibrium continuation value and hence an implicit function of the equilibrium tax rate. In
equilibrium, incentives must be compatible such that smg =  (1  )   W  1      2W .
The implied tax rate satises C  1   11 W . The equilibrium tax rate in (10), and hence
also the equilibrium level of diversion in (11), follows by substituting for W = s3 + W , where
s = sag + smg = 3 (1  )  2W .
If the nonnegativity constraint is binding, on the other hand, voters a can exert inuence on
the level of public goods provided because they know that legislator ag will have the incentive
to spend the entire budget (less the incentive compatible level of diversion) on public goods.
The threshold for when the distortionary and diversionary costs of taxation implied by  and 
actively constrain the equilibrium level of public goods provision results from the votersperceived
marginal cost of public goods, 1 =32(1 ) , and is given by
1 =3
2(1 ) = 1:
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If 1 =32(1 )  1 and the non-negativity constraint on r is binding, it is optimal for voters a to
demand taxes that are high enough to nance a level of public goods provision equal to H 1g (1);
if a level of public goods provision equal to H 1g (1) is not feasible, voters a demand a tax rate
equal to 1. If 1 =32(1 ) > 1, the perceived aggregate marginal costs of taxation are higher for
voters a than for voters ag, implying that voters a e¤ectively constrain also the equilibrium
level of diversion sC by requesting a lower tax rate.
Finally, Bertrand competition for redistribution among voters i 6= ag on stages 5 and 6 implies
that all residual government revenue accrue to voters ag. However, redistribution only occurs
if the nonnegativity constraint on r is not binding (i.e., if H 1g (1) < 2W ) and also
1 =3
2(1 ) 
1. The equilibrium level of redistribution in (13) follows directly from the government budget
constraint.
8.1.3 Equilibrium in the parliamentary regime type
Denition A3 An equilibrium of the parliamentary regime type is a vector of policies
qPt (bt) =

Pt (bt) ; g
P
t (bt) ;

riPt (bt)
	
;

siPt ( bt)
	
and a a vector of reservation utilities bRt , such that, in any period t, when all players take as
given the equilibrium outcomes of periods t+ k; k  1:
34To arrive at the expression for the marginal cost to voters a of public goods, rst note that it will by denition
be optimal for ag and her voters to implement (dropping superscript C) r = 0 when either the preferences for
public goods are su¢ ciently strong, or when the tax costs exceed the threshold, implying that (i) g = 3 (1  ) s.
Second, from the expression for the continuation value W = s=3 + W and the combined incentive compatibility
condition s = 3 (1  )  2W , we get that W = 3(1 )
3  and (ii) s = [(1  )  ]
3(1 )
1 =3 . Substituting (ii) back
into (i) gives g = [(1  )  ] 2
1 =3 , which implies that the marginal tax cost facing voter a of increased public
goods provision is given by @
@g
=
1 =3
2(1 ) .
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(I) for any given bt, and given the proposal made at stage 3, at stage 4, the junior partner of
the coalition optimally chooses whether to accept or reject these proposals, given the reservation
utilities b0t and the expected policy outcomes in stages 58;
(II) the reservation utilities biP
0
t are optimal for the voters in each district i after a government
crisis at stage 4, when one takes into account that policies will be set according to qP
0
t

bP
0
t

as in the simple legislature equilibrium and takes as given the reservation utilities in the other
regions b iP
0
t ;
(III) for any given bt and b0t, the agenda setter in the coalition prefers
qPt (bt) =

Pt (bt) ; g
P
t (bt) ;

riPt (bt)
	
;

siPt ( bt)
	
;
given conditions (I) and (II) and the government budget constraint;
(IV) the reservation utilities biPt are optimal for the voters, in each district i, when one takes
into account that policies in the current period will be set according to qPt
 
bPt

, takes as given
expected bP
0
t and the fact that policies will be set according to q
P 0
t

bP
0
t

after a government
crisis at stage 4, and also takes as given the reservation utilities in other regions b iPt .
Proposition A3 In the parliamentary regime, there is a continuum of equilibria such that:
P =
8><>:
1 if   2=3 and the Nash game is consistent with rP > 0
min
h
1; 1 1 =3 +
1
3(1 )H
 1
g

1
3(1 )
i
if
(
 > 2=3; or :
  2=3 and nonneg: on r is binding
;
(17)
gP = min
bg; 2 (1  )
1  =3

bg : ( H 1g (1=2)  bg > H 1g (1) if   2=3
H 1g

1
3(1 )

if  > 2=3
; (18)
sP = s
0
=
3 (1  ) (1  )
1  =3 ; (19)
rP =
(
2(1 )
1 =3   gP  0 if   2=3 and the Nash game is consistent with rP > 0
0 if  > 2=3; or if   2=3 and nonnegativity on r is binding ; (20)
ba
0P =
(
H (g0)  g0 + 2(1 )1 =3 if   2=3
H (g0)  g0   3(1 )(1 )1 =3 if  > 2=3
(21)
bi
0P = H (g0) for i 6= a if   2=3: (22)
biP
0
= H (g0)  g0   3 (1  ) (1  )
1  =3 for all i if  > 2=3 (23)
All politicians are reelected and a government crisis never occurs.
Proof. The subgame in case of a government crisis which may be initiated by a veto from
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any of the members of the government coalition sets a benchmark, and e¤ectively constrains
the equilibrium in the parliamentary regime. In case of a government crisis, a subgame dened
by stages (5) to (8), comes into force. The legislators expected continuation value, given a
government crisis, is dened by E (v0) = s0=3 + W . Thus, at stages 3 and 4, the junior partner
m must be o¤ered at least this much to go along with the equilibrium (and not veto the proposal
from a), hence smg  E (v0)   W . These conditions must hold in every period, implying that
E (v0)  W = s0=3 = (1  )W .
The voters are forced to accept a level of diversion dened by s  s0, independent of the
equilibrium tax rate in the parliamentary regime; if the voters are more demanding, any member
of the government coalition has the incentive to initiate a crisis. Consequently, in equilibrium
voters demand diversion to be as low as possible, given the incentive-compatibility condition
s  s0, implying that relation (19) holds with equality.
Consider the voters of the government coalition, voters a andm. To go along with the equilib-
rium, their equilibrium reservation utilities, bi, i = a;m, must weakly dominate the reservation
utilities in case of a crisis, E (u0). Hence, bi = 1   +H (g) + ri  E (u0), which, using the ex-
pression forW in the proof of proposition A1 (see online appendix) can be written: bi  H (g0)+
2(1 )
3  + g
0=3. Additionally, the reservation utilities of these voters must be mutually consistent
for these equilibrium utilities to be best responses in a Nash game for redistribution. Thus, the
equilibrium in the parliamentary regime is characterized by multiple equilibria; any equilibrium
policy vector optimizes ba, given any bm.
The problem facing voters a is dened by
max
g;ra;rm;
[1   +H (g) + ra] ; (24)
subject to:
1   +H (g) + rm  bm  H (g0) + r0=3; (25)
  1; (26)
ra  0; (27)
rm  0: (28)
The solution to the Kuhn Tucker problem facing voters a, dened by equations (24) through
(28), is consistent with the equilibrium policy vector given by equations (17) through (23).
Inserting for s0 in the budget restriction and solving for  , gives  = g3(1 )+
ra
3(1 )+
rm
3(1 ) 
2=3
3(1 )(1 =3) +
1 
1 =3 . Reinserting into the object function of voters a, and optimizing, results
in the following necessary Kuhn Tucker optimality conditions:
  1
3 (1  ) +Hg + 

  1
3 (1  ) +Hg

   1
3 (1  ) = 0; (29)
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  1
3 (1  ) + 1 + 

  1
3 (1  )

   1
3 (1  ) + !
a = 0; (30)
  1
3 (1  ) + 

  1
3 (1  ) + 1

   1
3 (1  ) + !
m = 0; (31)
where ; ; !a; and !m are the multipliers of equations (25) through (28), respectively. Equa-
tions (30) and (31) imply that  = 1 + !a   !m. Equations (29) and (30) imply that
gP = H 1g

1 + !a
2 + !a   !m

: (32)
If  < 1 ( = 0), then 13(1 ) =
1+!a
2+!a !m () !a = 3 1 !
m
2 3 . The solution is thus critically
depending on the value of the tax cost parameter :
a : When  > 2=3, !a = 3 1 !
m
2 3 , !
m; !a 6= 0, and pure redistribution is too expensive
(r = 0). The optimal level of public goods provision is found by substituting !a = 3 1 !
m
2 3
into equation (32), which gives that gP = H 1g

1
3(1 )

< H 1g (1). To see this, note that any
positive amount of redistribution would violate voter demands, as dened in equation (25); that
is, the voters in at least one of the constituencies i = a;m would prefer a government crisis to
an outcome with a positive level of redistribution.
b : When   2=3, !a = 3 1 !m2 3 is impossible, and there are two possible outcomes:
i) If !m = !a = 0, then  = 1 and gP = H 1g (1=2). If !
m = 0, then H 1g (1) < g
P =
H 1g

1+!a
2+!a

< H 1g (1=2). If !
a = 0, then gP = H 1g

1
2 !m

< H 1g (1=2). In this last case,
by eq. (25), gP  g0, depending on whether the nonnegativity constraint on r is binding.
ii) If 1=3    2=3, voters a and m may want the government to shut down re-
distribution and to implement  < 1 and gP>2=3, where g
P
>2=3  H 1g

1
3(1 )

, even if the
nonnegativity constraint on redistribution is not binding, depending on the outcome of the Nash
game over redistribution. In particular, redistribution will be shut down if, for the weaker part of
the two groups (say voters m), 1  P>2=3 +H

gP>2=3

> H

gP2=3

+ rP;m2=3, where, 
P
>2=3
is the level of taxes needed to sustain gP>2=3 (given the incentive compatible level of diversion),
gP2=3 is as dened in bi), and r
P;m
2=3 is the level of redistribution consistent with any given
Nash outcome between voters a and m. Hence, H 1g (1)  gP>2=3  H 1g (1=2), and there exist
multiple equilibria, dependent on the Nash outcome.
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